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In this paper we analyze a simple contracting model where the manager is loss averse and explore to
what extent its predictions are consistent with salient features of observed compensation contracts.
We parameterize this model using standard assumptions and then compare the contracts generated
by the model with those actually observed for a large sample of U.S. CEOs. Our main conclusion
is that for a range of parameterizations a principal-agent model with loss-averse agents generates
convex compensation contracts and can approximate observed contracts better than the standard
model based on risk aversion that is widely used in the literature.
The theoretical literature on executive compensation contracts is largely based on contracting
models where shareholders (principal) are risk-neutral and where the manager (agent) is risk averse,
which is modeled with a concave utility function. Quantitative studies in compensation research rely
more or less entirely on a standard model with constant relative risk aversion, lognormally distributed
stock prices, and e¤ort aversion.1 However, Hall and Murphy (2002) and Dittmann and Maug (2007)
show that the standard CRRA-lognormal model cannot explain observed compensation practice if
companies and managers can bargain over all components of CEO compensation packages. Dittmann
and Maug (2007) nd that the optimal predicted contract almost never contains any options and
typically features negative base salaries.2
In this paper we suggest a new approach to explaining the almost universal presence of stock
options by assuming that managerspreferences exhibit loss aversion as described by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991, 1992). On the basis of experimental evidence
they argue that choices under risk exhibit three features: (i) reference dependence, where agents do
not value their nal wealth levels, but evaluate outcomes relative to some benchmark or reference
level; (ii) loss aversion, which adds the notion that losses (measured relative to the reference level)
loom larger than gains; (iii) diminishing sensitivity, so that individuals become progressively less
1 Calibration exercises with CRRA preferences and lognormal distributed stock prices include Lambert, Larcker, and
Verrecchia (1991), Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002), and Hall and Knox (2004). Closely related to this are papers that
combine CRRA-preference with geometric Brownian motions or a binomial approach in a dynamic model, see Huddart
(1994), Carpenter (1998), Johnson and Tian (2000a, 2000b) and Ingersoll (2006). The applications by Haubrich (1994),
Haubrich and Popova (1998), and by Margiotta and Miller (2000) use constant absolute risk aversion when calibrating
a principal-agent model.
2There are a few extensions of the standard risk-aversion model that can explain option holdings. Feltham and
Wu (2001) and Dittmann and Yu (2009) consider risk-taking incentives, Oyer (2004) models options as a device to
retain employees when recontracting is expensive, and Inderst and Müller (2005) explain options as instruments that
provide outside shareholders with better liquidation incentives. Hemmer, Kim, and Verrecchia (1999) assume gamma
distributed stock prices and nd convex contracts, but Dittmann and Maug (2007) show that these results are not
robust. With the exception of Dittmann and Yu (2009), none of these models has ever been calibrated to data, and
some models are too stylized to be calibrated at all.
1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=914502
sensitive to incremental gains and incremental losses. These assumptions accord well with a large
body of experimental literature, which shows that the standard expected utility paradigm based on
maximizing concave utility functions cannot explain a number of prominent patterns of behavior.3
We develop a stylized principal-agent model with a loss-averse agent and show how it can be
calibrated to individual CEO data. In the rst part of the paper, we consider piecewise linear
contracts that consist of xed salary, stock and one option grant. Our calibration method yields a
predicted contract for each of the 595 U.S. CEOs in our data set, and we compare these predicted
contracts with observed contracts in order to determine whether the model is descriptive of the data.
The literature provides no guidance on the appropriate level of the reference point, so we repeat the
analysis for a range of di¤erent levels of the managers reference wage. We nd that the loss-aversion
model can explain observed contracts very well if the managers reference wage is low, i.e. not much
higher than last years xed salary and bonus. The model then predicts realistic option holdings
and salaries. For higher reference wages however, the loss-aversion model cannot generate observed
contracts; it then predicts negative option holdings and negative salaries, just like the benchmark
risk-aversion model.
In order to understand these results, we derive, analyze, and calibrate the optimal nonlinear
contract in the second part of the paper. It turns out that the optimal contract features two regions:
First, above a certain critical stock price, it is increasing and convex and pays out at least the
reference wage. In the second region below this critical stock price, compensation falls discontinuously
to a lower bound, a feature that is reminiscent of performance-related dismissals. The intuition for
this drop is that a loss-averse CEO is risk-loving whenever her pay falls below her reference wage.
Therefore, whenever the contract pays o¤below the reference wage, it can only pay the lowest possible
wage, because any intermediate payo¤ can be improved upon by a lottery over more extreme payo¤s.
If the reference wage is low, the optimal contract features a low dismissal probability and is
dominated by the region where the contract is increasing and convex. This shape can be approximated
3See Kahneman and Tversky (2000) and Post et al. (2008) as well as the papers they cite. There is broad
experimental support for loss aversion in particular: Rabin (2000) calls loss aversion the most rmly established
feature of risk preferences.Recent experimental evidence in nance includes Gneezy, Kapetyn, and Potters (2003) and
Haigh and List (2005). Chen, Lakshminarayanan and Santos (2006) experiment with capuchin monkeys and suggest
that loss aversion is a basic evolutionary trait that extends beyond humans. There are also some papers that take a
more critical stance. Myagkov and Plott (1997) document that risk-seeking implied by prospect theory diminishes with
experience. Plott and Zeiler (2005) call into question the general interpretation of gaps between the willingness to pay
and the willingness to accept as evidence for loss aversion.
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with high salaries and positive stock and option holdings that we observe in practice. As the reference
wage increases, the dismissal probability increases while the contract becomes atter in the region
above the critical stock price where the CEO keeps his job. Consequently, e¤ort incentives are
provided increasingly through the threat of dismissal and less through pay-for-performance "on the
job." For high reference wages, the piecewise linear contract therefore approximates the discontinuous
drop in compensation with negative salaries, high stock holdings and negative option holdings.
The loss-aversion model can generate convex contracts, because the agents aversion to risk is
concentrated in the neighborhood of the reference point, where risk tolerance is almost zero. As the
payout increases, the agent becomes rapidly more risk tolerant. Optimal risk sharing implies that
the contract is more high-powered where the risk-tolerance of the CEO is higher, so the fast increase
of risk-tolerance leads to optimal contracts that are convex. By contrast in the risk-aversion model,
risk-tolerance is mainly determined by the agents wealth and therefore increases only slowly with
increasing payouts. As a consequence, the shape of the optimal risk-aversion contract is dominated
by a second e¤ect: the decreasing marginal utility that makes it more e¤ective to provide incentives
at low payout levels. This incentive e¤ect by itself results in a concave contract. The incentive e¤ect
is also present in the loss-aversion model, but is dominated by the risk-tolerance e¤ect. The ability to
quantitatively disentangle the importance of these e¤ects for individual CEO compensation contracts
is a strength of our calibration approach.
A noteworthy cross-sectional implication of our model is that CEOs with a higher reference wage
have less performance-related pay, but they are attracted to rms with better corporate governance
standards where they have a higher probability of being red. This prediction is supported by Fahlen-
brachs (2009) nding that performance-related pay and good corporate governance are substitutes.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature that applies loss aversion successfully to problems
in nance. Benartzi and Thaler (1995, 1999) develop the notion of myopic loss aversion and use it
to explain the equity-premium puzzle. Gomes (2005) and Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004)
apply the model to portfolio choice. Barberis and Huang (2001) and Barberis, Huang and Santos
(2001) apply loss aversion to the explanation of the value premium. Coval and Shumway (2005) use
loss aversion to explain patterns of intraday risk-taking in a eld study of CBOT-traders. Genesove
and Mayer (2001) nd that sellers in the housing market exhibit loss aversion. Kouwenberg and
Ziemba (2007) study the incentives and investment decisions of hedge-fund managers, and Loughran
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and Ritter (2002) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005) base their measure of issuer satisfaction in
initial public o¤erings on loss aversion. Massa and Simonovs (2005) study of individual investor
behavior is the only study in nance we found that fails to support loss aversion.
The only paper so far that rigorously applies loss aversion to principal-agent theory is de Meza
and Webb (2007). They make two important contributions. First, they show that some part of
the optimal compensation contract should be insensitive to rm performance and can therefore be
represented by options. Second, they endogenize the reference wage by relating it, among others, to
the median of the wage distribution. We build on their rst contribution and show that optimal loss-
aversion contracts can be implemented best with combinations of stock and options. We also nd at
parts of the compensation contract, which become relevant if the reference wage is close to the median
of the wage distribution. However, then the overall ability of the model to approximate observed
contracts is low. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst paper that explores empirically the
potential of loss aversion to explain compensation contracts.
In the following Section I we develop the model and discuss the main assumptions. Section
II explains our calibration method and the construction of the data set. Section III contains our
calibration results for piecewise linear contracts that consist of base salary, stock and options. In
Section IV, we theoretically derive and calibrate the general (nonlinear) shape of the optimal contract.
Section V performs some robustness checks. Section VI develops the cross-sectional predictions of
the model and indicates some avenues for future research. All proofs and derivations are deferred to
the appendix.
I. The model
We consider a standard principal-agent model where shareholders (the principal) make a take-it-
or-leave-it o¤er to a CEO (the agent) who then provides e¤ort that enhances the value of the rm.
Shareholders can only observe the stock market value of the rm but not the CEOs e¤ort (hidden
action).
Contracts and technology. The contract is a wage function w (PT ) that species the wage of the
manager for a given realization of the company value PT at time T . Contract negotiations take place
at time 0: At the end of the contracting period, T , the value of the rm PT is commonly observed
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and the wage is paid according to w (PT ). PT depends on the CEOs e¤ort e 2 [0;1) and the state
of nature u.
For our calibrations, we assume - as does most of the literature - that the end-of-period value is
lognormally distributed with
PT (u; e) = P0 (e) exp

rf   
2
2

T + u
p
T

; u  N (0; 1) ; (1)
where rf is the risk-free rate of interest, 2 is the variance of the returns on the stock, u is a standard
normal random variate, and P0(e) is a strictly increasing and concave function.4
Preferences and outside option. Throughout we assume that shareholders are risk-neutral. The
managers preferences are additively separable in income and e¤ort and can be represented by
V (w (PT ))  C (e) ; (2)
where C (e) is an increasing and convex cost function. The assumption of additive separability in
e¤ort and income is conventional in the literature, and our strategy is to follow conventions in the
literature for all aspects other than the modeling of preferences.5 Following Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), we assume preferences over wage income, w (PT ) ; of the form
V (w (PT )) =
8><>:
 
w (PT )  wR

if w (PT )  wR
   wR   w (PT ) if w (PT ) < wR ; where 0 < ;  < 1 and   1: (3)
Here, wR denotes the reference wage.6 If the payo¤ of the contract at time T exceeds the reference
wage, then the manager codes this as a gain, whereas a payo¤ lower than wR is coded as a loss. We
will refer to the range of the wage above wR as the gain space and to the range below wR as the
loss space. There are three aspects that set this specication apart from standard concave utility
4This specication ignores dividends for simplicity of exposition. We include dividends in our numerical analysis.
5To the best of our knowledge, Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2008) is the only paper in the compensation literature
where the link between C and V is multiplicative rather than additive. This feature of their model seems to be critical
for their calibrations of the optimal level of incentives. However, we are interested only in the structure, but not in the
level of incentives.
6This preference specication was introduced into the nance literature by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and was also
used by Langer and Weber (2001), Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004), and Barberis and Huang (2008). De Meza
and Webb (2007) use a generalized version of loss-aversion.
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specications. First, the parameter  > 1 gives a higher weight to payo¤s below the reference wage.
This reects the observation from psychology that losses loom larger than gains of comparable size.
Formally, this introduces a kink in the value function at wR and thus locally innite risk-aversion.
Second, the manager treats her income from the rm separately from income from other sources, a
phenomenon that is often referred to as "framing" or "mental accounting" (Thaler, 1999). Third,
while V (w (PT )) is concave over gains, it is convex over losses. Throughout this paper, we will
refer to a CEO with preferences of the form (3) as loss averse and to the corresponding principal
agent-model as the loss-aversion model or, for brevity, as the LA-model.7
We assume that the reference point wR is exogenous in two respects. First, the reference point
does not depend on any of the parameters of the contract. Alternative assumptions would relate
the reference point to the median or the mean payo¤ of the contract w (PT ), which would increase
the mathematical complexity of the argument substantially. De Meza and Webb (2007) focus on
this aspect of applying loss aversion to principal-agent theory. Second, the reference point is also
independent of the level of e¤ort. This is defensible if the cost of e¤ort is non-pecuniary and if
the manager separates the costs of e¤ort from the pecuniary wage. However, this is potentially a
strong assumption if the costs are pecuniary and the manager frames the problem so that she feels
a loss if her payo¤ does not exceed wR plus any additional expenses for exerting e¤ort. In the
second case, C (e) should simply be added to the reference point wR. We do not pursue this route
here for mathematical tractability. With an exogenous reference point the distinguishing feature
of the loss-aversion model is that the attitude to risk is not a global property but is di¤erent for
wage distributions centered around the reference point compared to distributions where most of the
probability mass is far away from the reference point.
The manager has some outside employment opportunity that provides her with a value net of e¤ort
costs V , so any feasible contract must satisfy the ex ante participation constraint E [V (w (PT ))]  
C (e)  V . We assume that the principal cannot pay a wage below some lower bound w on the wage
function such that w  w (PT ) for all PT , where w < wR. If the manager would be required to invest
all her private wealth in the securities of the rm, then her total payo¤ cannot fall below  W0 in
any state of the world, and this would happen only if these securities expired worthless at the end of
7Strictly speaking, the term loss aversion refers to the fact that the agent is more averse to losses than he or she is
attracted to gains, hence only to the rst characteristic mentioned in the text. For brevity, we use loss aversion more
comprehensively to refer to a model that comprises all three characteristics.
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the period. This makes w =  W0 a natural choice, but higher values of w may also be plausible.
Optimization problem. The shareholdersproblem can be written as (see Holmström (1979)):
max
e; w(PT )w
E [PT   w (PT ) je] (4)
s:t: E [V (w (PT )) je]  V + C (e) ; (5)
e 2 argmaxe2[0;1) fE [V (w (PT )) je]  C(e)g ; (6)
We replace the incentive compatibility constraint (6) by the rst order condition
d
de
E [V (w (PT )) je]  C 0(e) = 0: (7)
It is always legitimate to do this if we can ensure that the managers maximization problem when
choosing her e¤ort level is globally concave, so that the rst order condition uniquely identies the
maximum of her objective function. This requires that the following condition holds for all e¤ort
levels, so that the managers problem is globally concave:
d2E (V (w (PT )) je)
de2
=
Z
V (w (PT ))
d2f (PT je)
de2
dPT   d
2C (e)
de2
< 0 . (8)
Condition (8) can be used for the loss-aversion as well as for the risk-aversion model. It will not
hold generally, because the function V (w (PT )) is convex in the loss space and because the optimal
contract w (PT ) may be convex. However, we can ensure that condition (8) holds for some cost
functions C and some density functions in two ways. First, equation (8) shows that this condition
will be satised for su¢ ciently convex cost functions, so that @2C (e) =@e2 is bounded from below
such that (8) holds. Second, if the production function PT (e) is su¢ ciently concave (such that
@2PT (e) =@e
2 is su¢ ciently small for all e¤ort levels), then (8) will also be satised. We assume in
the following that at least one of these conditions applies.
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Benchmark. The standard implementation in the literature on executive compensation features
preferences with constant relative risk aversion (see Footnote 1 in the Introduction):
V CRRA (w (PT )) =
(W0 + w (PT ))
1 
1   ; (9)
where W0 denotes wealth and  represents the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. We use this
parameterization as our benchmark risk-aversion model (RA-model). Some papers also use constant
absolute risk aversion. We nd very similar results if we compute our main calibration results with
CARA-preferences instead of CRRA-preferences. These results can be found in Tables B.I and B.II
in the Internet Appendix.8
II. Implementation and data
A. Implementation
This section describes our numerical calibration method. The method allows us to derive optimal
contracts for an individual CEO without specifying the cost function C(e) or the production function
P0(e).
Calibration approach. Our strategy for nding optimal contracts adopts the approach pioneered
by Grossman and Hart (1983), who divide the solution to the optimal contracting problem into two
stages. The rst stage solves for the optimal contract by minimizing the expected compensation
costs for a given level of e¤ort and determines the cost of implementing this e¤ort level. The second
stage solves for the optimal contract by trading o¤ the benets of a particular e¤ort level (here: the
value of the rm) with the implementation costs determined at the rst stage. We only consider the
rst stage, i.e. we search for the cheapest contract for a given level of e¤ort.
We work with the null hypothesis that the observed contract is equal to the optimal contract from
our model. E¤ectively, this is a joint hypothesis: it states that our model is the correct model and that
shareholders have indeed implemented the optimal contract. One implication of this null hypothesis
is that the (unobservable) e¤ort level that is induced by the observed contract is the optimal e¤ort
8The Internet Appendix for this article is available online in the "Supplements and Datasets" section at
http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp.
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level. In our calibrations, we therefore search for the cheapest contract that implements the e¤ort
level induced by the observed contract. If the null hypothesis is correct, the result of this optimization
will be equal (or close to) the observed contract. However, if the contract found in the calibrations
di¤ers markedly from the observed contract, we can reject the null hypothesis. Then the e¤ort
induced by the observed contract can be implemented in a less expensive way.
We now show that this reduced problem can be solved without knowledge of the cost function
C (e) or the production function P0 (e). We rst rewrite the rst order condition (7) as:
PPS (w (PT )) =
dC (e)
de
=
dP0 (e)
de
; (10)
where: PPS (w (PT )) =
d
dP0
E [V (w (PT ))] : (11)
Here, PPS denotes the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the contract, which is adjusted for the
preferences of the CEO and reduces to the standard (risk-neutral) pay-for-performance sensitivity
for V (w (PT )) = w (PT ).
Let wd (PT ) be the observed contract. Here and in the following we use the superscript d in
order to refer to observed values or data.Our null hypothesis is that wd (PT ) is an optimal contract,
which satises condition (10). We can therefore rewrite the rst-order condition (10) again as:
PPS (w (PT )) = PPS(w
d (PT )): (12)
Using the same reasoning, we can also rewrite the participation constraint (5) as:
E [V (w (PT ))]  E
h
V

wd (PT )
i
: (13)
Finally, since we are solving only the rst stage of Grossman and Hart (1983), the objective function
for the numerical program is:
min
w(PT )
E [w(PT )] : (14)
Observe that both constraints (12) and (13) do not depend on the cost function C (e) or the produc-
tion function P0 (e). We assume rational expectations and hence the observed market capitalization
equals P0 (be), where be is the chosen e¤ort level based on the observed contract, which are both
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anticipated by the market.
Finding optimal contracts as a solution to program (12) to (14) is intuitive. The program searches
for a contract w (PT ) (i) that provides the same incentives as the observed contract from (12); it
therefore implements the same level of e¤ort and generates the same value of the rm; (ii) that
provides at least the same utility to the CEO as the observed contract from (13); (iii) that minimizes
the costs to shareholders. If the model is a good approximation to the pay-setting process, then the
optimal contract w (PT ) generated by the model should be close (in a sense to be dened) to the
observed contract wd (PT ).
Note that shareholdersobjective to reduce the CEOs rents never plays a role in our analysis.
Any rent the agent receives in the observed contract (possibly due to limited liability, rigid base
salaries, or managerial power) is preserved in our calibrations, because the participation constraint
(13) ensures that the agents utility from the optimal contract is never lower than her utility from
the observed contract.9
Preference parameters. For the preference parameters , , and  we rely on the experimental
literature for guidance. We therefore use  =  = 0:88 and  = 2:25 as our baseline values.10
Piecewise linear contracts. The program (12) to (14) is mathematically well-dened but suitable
for numerical calibrations only if we restrict the shape of the contract w(PT ) so that the wage
function can be represented with a small number of parameters. In the next section, we work with
the restriction that the optimal contract is piecewise linear and consists of xed salary (), stock
(nS), and options (nO):
wlin (PT ) = e
rfT + nSPT + nOmax (PT  K; 0) : (15)
The numerical program (12) to (14) then searches for the cheapest contract across the parameters ,
nS , and nO; that satises the participation and incentive compatibility constraints. The remaining
9Rents may also arise in the loss-aversion model in equilibrium. Our preference specication (3) implies that the
agents utility is bounded from below, so that she may obtain rents in equilibrium (see Proposition 2 and Assumption
A1 in Grossman and Hart (1983)).
10See Tversky and Kahneman (1992). These values have become somewhat of a standard in the literature, see for
example Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Langer and Weber (2001), Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004), Barberis and
Huang (2008). For experimental studies on the preference parameters which yield parameter values in a comparable
range see Abdellaoui (2000) and Abdellaoui, Vossmann and Weber (2005).
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parameters, the strike price K and the maturity T of the option grant, are estimated from the data
as described in the next section.
B. Data
We identify all CEOs in the ExecuComp database who are CEO for the entire scal years 2004
and 2005. We delete all CEOs who were executives in more than one company in either 2004 or
2005. We set P0 equal to the market capitalization at the end of 2004 and take the dividend rate d,
the stock price volatility , and the proportion of shares owned by the CEO ndS from the 2004 data,
while the xed salary d is calculated from 2005 data.11
Option portfolios. We estimate the option portfolio held by the CEO from 2004 data using the
procedure proposed by Core and Guay (2002). The resulting option portfolio typically consists of
several option grants with di¤erent strike prices and di¤erent maturities. As our model has only one
period and consequently allows only one maturity, we map this option portfolio into one representative
option: We rst set the number of options nO equal to the sum of the options in the option portfolio.
Then we determine the strike price K and the maturity T of the representative option such that nO
representative options have the same market value and the same Black-Scholes option delta as the
estimated option portfolio. We take into account the fact that most CEOs exercise their stock options
before maturity by multiplying the maturity of the individual options in the estimated portfolio by
0.7 before calculating the representative option (see Huddart and Lang, 1996, and Carpenter, 1998).
The maturity T determines the contracting period and the risk-free rate rf is the U.S. government
bond rate from January 2005 with maturity closest to T .
Reference point. Prospect theory does not provide us with clear guidance with respect to the
reference point. The reference wage is the wage below which the CEO regards the payments she
receives from the company as a loss. We therefore study alternative values for the reference wage
and assume that the reference wage reects expectations the CEO forms based on her previous years
(i.e. 2004) compensation package. It seems natural that the CEO regards a total compensation (xed
11This reects the fact that stock and options are stock variables measured at the end of the period whereas base
salary is a ow measured during the period.  is the sum of the following four ExecuComp data types: Salary, Bonus,
Other Annual, and All Other Total. We do not include LTIP (long-term incentive pay), as these are typically not
awarded annually.
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and variable) below the xed salary of the previous year as a loss and we use this as a lower bound.
In addition, she may also build in some part of her deferred compensation into her reference wage.
Most likely, she will evaluate her securities at a substantial discount relative to their value for a
well-diversied investor. This discount depends on her attitude to risk and on her framing of the
wage-setting process. We therefore regard the market value of her existing contract based on the
current stock price and the number of shares and options she inherited from the previous period as
an upper bound for the reference wage.12 We denote the market value of her deferred compensation
in 2005 based on the number of shares and options she held in 2004 by MV and write:
wR2005 () = 2004 +  MV (nS2004; nO2004; P2005) : (16)
The parameter  is an index of the discount the CEO applies to her deferred compensation. If  = 0,
then the reference wage for 2005 equals her base salary for 2004. If  = 1, then the reference wage
equals the market value of her total compensation in the previous year, valued at current market
prices and without a discount for risk. We will look at a grid of alternative values for .
Minimum wage. For the minimum wage we rely on the argument above that the CEOs wage
cannot drop below  W0. Such a contract requires that the CEO invests all her non-rm wealth in
securities of her rm. There is anecdotal evidence that newly hired executives are asked to invest
some of their private wealth into their new company. In our base case, we therefore set the minimum
wage w equal to  W0. We argue that we should not exclude contracts with negative payouts just
because we rarely observe them. Instead, a good model should generate contracts with non-negative
payouts. Below we discuss a robustness check, where we repeat our analysis with the minimum wage
set equal to zero, an assumption that is more commonly made in the literature.
Wealth. We need an estimate of the CEOs non-rm wealth to evaluate relative risk aversion for
the RA-model and the lower bound w on the wage function for both models. We estimate the portion
of each CEOs wealth that is not tied up in securities of their company from historical data. We
cumulate the CEOs income from salary, bonus, and other compensation payments, add the proceeds
from sales of securities, and subtract the costs from exercising options. In order to obtain meaningful
12DeMeza and Webb (2007) develop a related argument why this discount may be substantial.
12
wealth estimates, we delete all CEOs with less than ve years history as executive of any rm in the
database. After deleting 4 CEOs of rms with stock volatility exceeding 250%, our data set contains
595 CEOs.
[Insert Table I here]
Table I, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for all variables in our data set. The median CEO
receives a xed salary of $1.7m, owns 0.3% of the rms equity and has options on another 1% of
the rms equity.13 The median rm value is $2.3bn and the median moneyness K=P0 is 0.7, so
most options are clearly in the money. The median maturity is 4.4 years. The distributions of the
contract parameters are highly skewed, so their means are substantially larger than their medians.14
We therefore base our inference on medians and Wilcoxon tests that are robust to skewness.
Table I, Panel B shows the corresponding statistics for the full sample of all executives who are
the CEO of a rm in the ExecuComp universe in 2004 and 2005. We lose 46% of these observations
due to our data requirements - mainly because of the required history of at least 5 years in the
database. Compared to the full sample, the CEOs in our sample own signicantly more options
(1.44% compared to 1.25%) and the rms in our sample exhibit lower stock return volatility (43%
compared to 49%). As a robustness check, we therefore analyze quintiles formed on the basis of
option holdings nO and (separately) of volatility  in order to investigate whether this bias a¤ects
our results.
III. Optimal contracts with stock and options
We now numerically solve the program (12) to (14) for linear contracts (15) that consist of xed
salary , stock nS , and options nO. In order to ensure that end-of-period wealth is non-negative
(limited liability), we need two additional constraints: First, we assume that the base salary is
limited by the managers non-rm wealth ( >  W0). Second, while we allow option awards to
13Option pay did not vanish in recent years after the burst of the new-economy bubble and recent changes in
accounting rules. New option grants amounted to 21.6% of total CEO compensation in 1992 and increased steadily
during the 1990s with a peak at 42.3% in 2001. They came down since then and accounted for 21.2% in 2005, e¤ectively
returning to their 1992 level. These numbers are calculated from the ExecuComp database and not shown in the tables.
14For the value of the contract, the mean even exceeds the 90th percentile. This extreme skewness is due to two
outliers (Warren Bu¤ett and Steven Ballmer) whose contract values both exceed $10bn. If we exclude them from our
sample, the average value of contract drops to $85m, i.e. far below the 90th percentile, and average wealth drops to
$30m. The remaining averages in Table I do not change substantially. We report a robustness check in Section V,
which shows that our results are not a¤ected by these outliers.
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become negative (i.e. managers can be required to write options), the managers short position in
options is restricted not to exceed her stock holdings nS , so nO >  nS .15 This restricts the wage
function to be non-decreasing. We could alternatively assume that option holdings are non-negative,
but the fact that in practice (to the best of our knowledge) managers never write options should be
a result of a good model and not an assumption. We report on robustness checks with non-negative
option holdings below.
For each CEO, we want to compare the observed contract with the optimal piecewise linear
contract for the LA-model and for the RA-model. For this we dene a metric to evaluate to what
extent each model predicts the observed composition of the contract between stock and options:
Di =
26664
0@n;iS   nd;iS
S| {z }
1A2
error(nS)
+
0@n;iO   nd;iO
O| {z }
1A2
error(nO)
37775
1=2
; (17)
where S and O are the cross-sectional standard deviations of observed stock holdings ndS and ob-
served option holdings ndO, respectively. D measures the distance between the observed contract and
the model contract and gives more weight to the parameter that has less cross-sectional dispersion.
D is an ad hoc measure that is meaningful only to compare di¤erent models; it is not the objective
function that is minimized in our estimation. A similar approach is used in Carpenter (1998) and
Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005).16
D does not take into account xed salaries. We have also developed a metric similar to D that
also includes base salaries and obtain similar results (not tabulated).17 To check the robustness of
this approach, we experimented with alternative metrics obtained by di¤erent weighting schemes and
di¤erent approaches to scaling the squared or absolute di¤erences between model parameters and
observed parameters. We found that all plausible approaches yield qualitatively similar results. This
is not surprising because the incentive compatibility constraint (12) ensures that deviations from
the observed value for options result in deviations for stock and vice versa, so that the scaling and
15This is the constraint if the dividend yield d equals zero. With dividends it becomes nO >  nS exp(dT ).
16The main di¤erence between their approach and ours is that we calibrate our model to individual observations,
whereas they calibrate their models to sample averages.
17Formally, deviations in the xed salary are determined by the deviations in stock and option holdings as the
participation constraint (13) always binds. If nS = ndS and nO = n
d
O, then  = 
d must hold. Therefore, including
salary in the metric (17) does not increase the metrics information content.
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weighting of any single parameter relative to the other is largely inconsequential.
[Insert Table II here]
Table II, Panel A summarizes the results for the LA-Model for seven di¤erent levels of the reference
wage as parameterized by  (see equation (16)). Panel B shows the results for the RA-model for
seven values of the coe¢ cient of relative risk-aversion .18 For each model we show the medians of
the contract parameters predicted by the models and the scaled mean deviations of these predicted
parameters from their observed counterparts (referred to as errors in equation (17)).
The performance of the LA-model is sensitive to the assumed reference wage. For lower values of
the reference wage ( = 0 to  = 0:2) the LA-model predicts values for all contract parameters that
are broadly consistent with the data. The scaled errors are below 0:5 in absolute value for  = 0:1
and  = 0:2 for all three contract parameters and the distance metric D is below 1. While the option
holdings are smaller than observed, the predicted magnitudes are similar to the observed magnitudes
and median option holdings are positive for all values of the reference wage up to and including
 = 0:4. Overall, the LA-model performs well as long as we assume that managers have reference
points that are closer to their xed salaries (which, in our simplication, includes bonus payments)
than to the market value of their total compensation. The t of the LA-model deteriorates markedly
for high values of the reference point ( > 0:4). Then it predicts negative median option holdings
and negative median base salaries, with scaled deviations and D-values in excess of 1. According to
this metric, we achieve the best t for the model for  = 0:1.
The RA-model (see Table II, Panel B) always predicts negative base salaries and negative option
holdings, so optimal RA-contracts are concave. The performance of the RA-model as measured by
18We report results for 11 values of the reference wage in the Internet Appendix, Table A.II. We do not consider values
of  below 0:1 in Table II as they lead to numerical problems. When the manager is risk-neutral, then the optimal
contract is indeterminate and the numerical problems for low values of  reect this indeterminacy. The literature
on executive compensation has often discussed values for  in the range between 2 and 3. Hall and Murphy (2000)
use these values that seem to go back to Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991). Lambert and Larcker (2004) more
recently proposed a value as low as 0.5. A useful point of reference here is the portfolio behavior of the CEO, since
very low levels of risk aversion (below 1) imply that CEOs have implausibly highly leveraged investments in the stock
market. Ingersoll (2006) develops a parameterization of the RA-model that is su¢ ciently similar to ours but includes
investments in the stock market. Using his equation (8) and assuming a risk premium on the stock market as low as
4% and a standard deviation of the market return of 20% gives an investment in the stock market (including exposure
to the stock market through holding securities in her own rm) equal to 1=. E.g.,  = 0:1, the lowest value considered
in Table II, would imply that the CEO invests ten times her wealth in the stock market. We do not wish to take a
restrictive stance in order not to bias our analysis in favor of the LA-model and therefore allow for levels of risk aversion
as low as 0:1, even though we regard such values as highly implausible.
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the distance metric D is generally worse than the performance of any parameterization of the LA-
model. The RA-model works best if risk aversion is either very low or very high. High risk aversion
reduces the incentives from options more than those from stock, so optimal RA-contracts feature
fewer additional shares to replace the existing options compared to lower levels of risk aversion. This
reduces the gap between optimal and observed contracts. However, the optimal contract always
remains concave, even for levels of risk aversion higher than shown in the table. On the other end of
the spectrum, if risk-aversion decreases and converges to zero, any observed contract is optimal (i.e.
cost minimizing), because subjective values are then identical to market values and all contracts that
generate the same incentives are equally costly. It is only for these very low levels of risk aversion
( = 0:1, 0:2) that the RA-model is more accurate than some LA-specications with a high reference
wage.
An important limitation of the analysis in Table II is the fact that it confounds two aspects of our
problem. First, we analyze and compare di¤erent approaches to modeling attitudes to risk. Second,
we also vary the overall attitude to risk as we change the reference wage or, respectively, the degree
of relative risk aversion. It therefore does not seem warranted to compare all parameterizations of
the LA-model with all parameterizations of the RA-model. As a next step, we therefore compare
the two models based on parameterizations that hold the overall attitude to risk constant in a
meaningful way. In particular, we compare parameterizations that generate the same valuation of
the observed contract by the same CEO. We dene the certainty equivalent of modelM , CEM , from
E
 
VM
 
wd (PT )

= V (CEM ): We x  to determine the reference wage of each CEO and then
dene an equivalent degree of relative risk aversion e from
CELA(wd; )  CERA(wd; e) : (18)
We refer to the value of e that satises (18) as the equivalent degree of relative risk aversion, because
it holds the certainty equivalent constant. A straightforward implication of this step is that we also
hold the risk premium paid by shareholders, E(wd)   CE(wd), constant for both models. For each
CEO and for each  we calculate the equivalent e and the optimal RA-contract with  = e. Table
III compares the two models in this way.
[Insert Table III here]
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Table III reports the mean and the median di¤erenceDRA DLA of the distance metricD between
the two models. The verdict based on the mean and median of D is clear and independent of the
overall attitude to risk: The LA-model dominates the RA-model for the entire range of reference
wages. However, the RA-model ts the data better than the LA-model according to D for a small
number of observations (3% - 18% of the sample), some of which generate extreme deviations for the
LA-model. The equivalent es are generally very low and below the range we regard as plausible
(see Footnote 18). They are also non-monotone in : As the reference wage increases or decreases far
enough, the kink of the value function moves into the tails of the payo¤ distribution, so that overall
risk aversion (which is captured by e) becomes smaller.
Table III also reports how successful the two models are in explaining the two stylized facts that
xed salaries and option holdings are almost always positive for observed CEO pay contracts. The
LA-model predicts positive option holdings for 91% of the sample for  = 0:1, the value that also yields
the best approximation overall. Moreover, the LA-model predicts positive salaries for the majority of
all CEOs when   0:2 and then it also predicts simultaneously positive option holdings and positive
base salaries. By contrast, the number of cases where the RA-model predicts simultaneously positive
option holdings and positive salaries is virtually zero. The model reduces options and exchanges
them for more stock and lower salaries until either the restriction on salaries (   W0) or the
restriction on option holdings (nO   nS exp(dT )) binds. This model can therefore never explain
positive option holdings and positive salaries simultaneously, while more than 99% of the CEOs in
our sample have such a contract. In sum, the LA-model can generate the qualitative characteristics
of observed contracts for the majority of the CEOs in our sample, provided we parameterize the
model appropriately. The standard RA-model is clearly inferior on this dimension.
IV. Optimal nonlinear contracts
Our calibrations show that a suitably parameterized loss-aversion model can explain observed
compensation practice better than the standard risk-aversion model. So far, however, our analysis
does not provide an intuition why this is the case. In this section we derive and analyze the shape
of the optimal unrestricted contract. This analysis provides us with a better understanding of when
and why the LA-model dominates the RA-model for piecewise linear contracts.
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A. The shape of the optimal contract
In this section we drop the restriction that w (PT ) is piecewise linear. The following proposition
describes the shape of the optimal nonlinear contract.
PROPOSITION 1. Under the assumptions (i) that the agents preferences are as described in (2)
and (3), (ii) that the stock price PT is lognormally distributed as described in (1), and (iii) that the
condition for the rst-order approach (8) holds, the optimal contract w (PT ) for the principal agent
problem (4) to (6), is:
w (PT ) =
8><>: w
R + (0 + 1 lnPT )
1
1  if PT > bP
w if PT  bP ; (19)
where bP is a uniquely dened, strictly positive cut-o¤ value and 0 and 1 are two parameters that
depend on the parameters of the problem and the Lagrange multipliers associated with the two con-
straints.
The details of the proof and an implicit denition of bP are deferred to Appendix A. In the proof
we derive a more general result for more general distributional assumptions. We state only the result
for the lognormal distribution here because this is what we need for our calibrations. The proof
involves three steps. The rst step shows that the optimal contract can never pay o¤ in the interior
of the loss space, so w (PT ) cannot lie strictly between w and wR. The reason is that the agent is
risk loving in the loss space, so we can improve on any payment in the loss space by replacing it with
a lottery between the lowest possible wage w and a payo¤ for some wage w  wR in the gain space.
The second step shows that such lotteries are not optimal, because incentives are improved if the
contract always pays w if the stock price falls below some critical value bP , and pays o¤ in the gain
space otherwise. The third step derives the Lagrangian and maximizes it pointwise with respect to
w (PT ), which gives (19).
Equation (19) shows that for the gain space, where PT > bP , we obtain a result very similar
to the familiar Holmström condition (Holmström, 1979, equation (7)) for optimal contracts in the
standard concave utility model (see also equation (A.10) in the Appendix). This is intuitive, since
the problem in the gain space, where preferences are concave, is structurally similar to a standard
utility-maximizing framework.
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COROLLARY 1. In the optimal contract (19), the size of the loss space decreases with loss aversion:
d bP
d < 0. Moreover, there exists an inection point P
I
T so that whenever P
I
T  bP , the optimal contract
is convex for all terminal stock prices PT 2
h bP ; P IT i and concave above the inection point.
Corollary 1 states that the optimal contract will make less use of "sticks," where the manager
receives only the minimum wage w, if she is more loss averse.19 The optimal nonlinear contract is
convex over a certain region, but above this region it becomes concave. Whether the convex region
exists and whether it is relevant is an empirical question, which we address in the following using our
calibration method from Section II.
B. Calibration of the optimal contract
Proposition 1 provides us with the functional form of the general optimal contract that only
depends on the two quantities 0 and 1. Once these two quantities are xed, the cut-o¤ value bP can
be calculated from equation (A.17) in the Appendix. We can then nd the solution to the program
in equations (12) to (14) for the optimal nonlinear contract just as we did with the piecewise linear
contract in Section III.20
Figure 1 shows the result of such a calibration for a representative CEO and two alternative
reference wages ( = 0:2, 0:8); it also displays the corresponding RA-contract with  = 2 and the
observed contract.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The gure illustrates that, for PT > bP , the optimal LA-contract pays o¤ only in the gain space.
Here, the contract is continuous, increasing and convex. The eventual concavity for high PT is
empirically not relevant for this CEO. If PT drops below bP , the optimal contract discontinuously
drops to the lowest possible wage w that is paid out for all PT  bP :21 If the reference point increases,
19The proof of Corollary 1 can be found in the Internet Appendix that is available online in the "Supplements and
Datasets" section at http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp.
20 In contrast to the piecewise linear contract, the general contract depends on only two parameters. As the numerical
optimization problem (12) to (14) features two constraints that are binding at the optimum, these two constraints
uniquely dene the optimal contract, which can therefore be calculated as the solution to a system of two equations
(12) and (13) in the two unknowns 0 and 1.
21De Meza and Webb (2007) nd a similar discontinuity in a principal agent model with loss aversion. In their
specication, however, the payo¤ jumps from w to wR and is at at wR before it possibly increases continuously. A
at payout at the reference wage wR occurs if the slope of the line that connects (0; w) and ( bP;wR) is steeper than the
slope of the utility function entering the gain space. With the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) value function (3), this
cannot occur because the slope entering the gain space is innite, so that the agent prefers a fair gamble over w and
wR + " to wR for " su¢ ciently small.
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the threshold bP increases and the contract becomes atter for PT > bP . Then more incentives are
provided by the discontinuous drop (which is reminiscent of ring the manager) compared to the slope
for stock prices above bP . If the reference wage is small, the discontinuity is less important and the
contract shape is dominated by its convexity for PT > bP that approximates the observed contract
very well. (In fact, the LA-contract for the even lower reference wage  = 0:1 ts the observed
contract best. We do not show this in Figure 1 for visual clarity.) In contrast to the LA-contract,
the RA-contract is always concave for a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion greater than 1 and is thus
strikingly at odds with observed contracts for conventional levels of risk aversion (see also Dittmann
and Maug (2007)).
A prominent feature of the optimal contract (19) is that it involves disciplining dismissals, i.e.
minimum payouts for all realizations of the stock price PT below the threshold bP . However, our
model does not fully capture the true nature of dismissals. What we capture is the loss of income
and human capital of the dismissed CEO. A second, and arguably more important e¤ect is that
the old CEO is replaced with a new CEO who is expected to perform better in the future. This
second e¤ect cannot be modeled in a one-period set-up and is therefore entirely absent from our
model. Also, rm performance explains only a fraction of the variation in CEO turnover (Kaplan
(1994), Jenter and Kanaan (2006)) and most dismissed CEOs receive generous severance payments
that should not be paid if dismissals were purely disciplinary. We therefore do not include dismissals
when we estimate empirical contracts in Section II.B.22 For brevity, however, we continue to use the
word "dismissal" to describe the drop in compensation to the lowest feasible level for low stock price
realizations. In the calibrations, we also calculate the probability of such a dismissal as
p(P^ )  Pr(PT  bP ) = Z P^
0
f (PT ) dPT : (20)
To put this number into perspective, we compare the mean dismissal probability generated by the
model with the mean in the data. We estimate the average probability of dismissal by calculating the
frequency with which CEOs in the ExecuComp database leave the company within a given four-year
period, where the recorded reason is resigned.We repeat this for all four-year periods between 1995
22Even if we would like to take into account dismissals when estimating the observed contract we would hardly be
able to do so for two reasons. First, only cross-sectional results are available for the probability of dismissals, so we
cannot estimate them individually for each CEO from this CEOs data only. Second, we do not have any information
on the loss in human capital and the severance pay the CEO expects to receive in case of a dismissal.
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and 2004 and obtain an average dismissal probability of 7:4%. For the reasons given above, only
some of these dismissals are likely to be disciplinary in nature, so our model should generate a much
smaller probability if it ts the data well. We also report the incentives from dismissals, which is the
fraction of the total incentives PPS from (11) that is due to the discontinuous drop in compensation
at the point PT = bP .
Table IV displays our results for the calibrations of the general loss-aversion contract (19) to
each CEO in our sample again for di¤erent assumptions on the CEOsreference wage. We do not
tabulate the averages of the two parameters 0 and 1 as they cannot be interpreted independently
from one another. Instead, the table shows the averages of the dismissal probability, the incentives
from dismissal, the inection point where the shape of the contract changes from convex to concave,
and the change in CEO wealth if the stock price decreases or increases by  50%,  30%, +30%, or
+50%. These numbers serve as an indication of the slope and the convexity of the optimal contract
in the gain space.
[Insert Table IV here]
The contracts predicted by the LA-model are on average convex for both measures of convexity.
The upward change of wealth for an increase in the stock price is always bigger than the corresponding
downward change, e.g., for  = 0:1, the median change in compensation is 41.8% if the stock price
increases by 30%, but compensation declines by only 35.9% if the stock price falls by the same
amount. Also, virtually all of the probability mass for this contract lies to the left of the inection
point, rendering the concave part of the contract irrelevant. For low reference wages where   0:2,
dismissals are unlikely and provide little incentives for the CEO. Here, almost all incentives are
generated by the increasing and convex payo¤ in the gain space. This picture changes markedly
for higher reference wages. The probability of dismissals rises quickly with  to as much as 20%
for  = 1 while the payo¤ in the gain space becomes atter, e.g., for a stock price increase of 30%
the median increase in compensation falls from 41.8% ( = 0:1) to 7.5% ( = 1). So, dismissals
provide most of the incentives for high reference wages. Intuitively, CEOs with a higher reference
wage demand more compensation, and they receive it in the sense that their compensation while they
are employed is larger. However, then incentives are provided to a lesser extent through the slope of
the wage function and to a larger extent through the threat of dismissals. Given that the empirical
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dismissal probability is 7:4% and that a (potentially large) fraction of these empirical dismissals are
not disciplinary in nature, the model ts the data best for low levels of the reference wage.
C. Why can the loss-aversion model explain convex contracts?
The LA-contract has two prominent features: (1) the discontinuous drop if the stock price PT
falls below the threshold bP and (2) the convexity for stock prices above this threshold. It is the
second feature that makes the LA-model a good approximation for small reference wages in Figure
1. By contrast, the discontinuous drop does not improve the t and is the reason why the LA-model
is less successful for higher reference wages.
An intuition for the discontinuous drop can be developed rather easily: The agent is risk-loving
in the loss space, so any payout within the loss space is ine¢ cient; the agent prefers a fair lottery over
w and some point above the reference wage wR to any payout within the loss space. The incentive
e¤ect of these extreme payouts is then maximized if all the probability mass where w is paid out is
concentrated at the lowest stock price realizations.
What is less apparent is that the LA-contract is convex in the gain space even though the
preference specication for gains (equation (3)) is the same as the CRRA utility function (equation
(9)) for  = 1   = 0:12. Still, the RA-contract is concave even for risk aversion as low as  = 0:1
(see Table II, Panel B). The di¤erence between the two functions is that the LA-model evaluates the
outcome relative to the reference wage wR, whereas the RA-model evaluates the absolute outcome,
i.e. the outcome relative to the worst case  W0.
There are two e¤ects that determine the curvature of the optimal contract in both models. The
rst is the incentive e¤ect that it is optimal to provide incentives where marginal utility V 0 (w) (or, in
the LA-model, marginal value) is high. Marginal utility is decreasing in the wage w in the RA-model
and in the gain space of the LA-model, so without any o¤setting e¤ect the slope of both contracts
should be higher for low stock prices than for high stock prices, i.e. both contracts should be concave.
The countervailing e¤ect is risk tolerance RT (w) =  V 0 (w) =V 00 (w), which is the inverse of absolute
risk aversion in the RA-model and similarly dened in the LA-model. It is cheaper for the principal
to provide incentives in regions where risk tolerance is high, because the risk premium the agent
requires is then lower. Risk tolerance increases with the wage w in both models: as the payo¤s
increase the agent becomes less averse to risk. Hence if risk tolerance were the only relevant e¤ect,
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incentives should be provided at high stock prices and the contract would be convex in both models.23
In Appendix B we show that the slope of the optimal contract for the RA-model and for the gain
space of the LA-model can be written as:
dw (PT )
dPT
= RT (w)V 0 (w)
0
PT
: (21)
Intuitively, the optimal contract is convex (i.e. the slope (21) increases with PT ) only if risk tolerance
RT (w) increases faster than marginal utility V 0 (w) (divided by PT ) declines.24
The strength of the risk tolerance e¤ect di¤ers greatly between the two models, which can be
observed from inspecting the expressions for risk tolerance directly:
RTLA (w) =
w (PT )  wR
1   ; RT
RA (w) =
w (PT ) +W0

: (22)
For the LA-model, risk-tolerance is close to zero near the reference point and then increases quickly.
This reects the fact that in the LA-model, risk-aversion is concentrated around the reference point
and becomes negligible far away from the reference point. Likewise, in the RA-model risk-tolerance
is close to zero near the minimum payout  W0, but relevant and likely payouts are far away from
this point, and there risk-tolerance is high and does not vary much with compensation and therefore
with the stock price. As a consequence, the risk-tolerance e¤ect is much stronger in the LA-model
than in the RA-model. This result cannot be shown theoretically.25 It is a strength of our calibration
method that it allows us to establish this result empirically.
De Meza and Webb (2007) can also rationalize the presence of options in loss-aversion contracts,
but their argument is di¤erent from ours. They obtain option-type payo¤s if they assume that the
agent is risk-averse in the loss space (see in particular their Figure 1(b) and their Proposition 1 (iii)),
which di¤ers from the Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992) framework employed here. By contrast,
we obtain option-type contracts from the convexity of the optimal contract in the gain space for the
reasons explained above.
23 If the manager has constant absolute risk aversion, then risk tolerance RT is constant across stock prices and the
risk-tolerance e¤ect does not induce any convexity.
24This argument is not limited to our context and extends to any utility (or value) function and can easily be extended
to other distributional assumptions.
25For the RA-model, it can be shown that the incentive e¤ect is always stronger than the risk tolerance e¤ect if
 > 1; i.e. if the CEO is more risk averse than implied by log utility.
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D. Comparison of linear and nonlinear contracts
With these insights about the optimal contract in the loss-aversion model, we can now develop
an intuition for the results for the piecewise linear contract in Section III. The piecewise linear
contract is an approximation to the general contract shown in Figure 1. A contract with stock and
one option grant can only capture either the discontinuous drop in compensation for low payouts or
the convexity for high payouts. For low reference wages most incentives come from the increasing
convex payout for higher stock prices. This shape is best approximated by a contract with stock
and options, which we nd for low reference wages. For higher reference wages the discontinuous
drop becomes more important. This discontinuity can best be approximated by a contract with low
and even negative base salaries, large stock holdings, and negative option holdings, which we nd for
higher reference wages.
In principle, the optimal nonlinear contract (19) could be approximated with a su¢ ciently large
number of options with di¤erent strike prices, where option holdings are negative for some strike
prices to approximate the discrete jump and the concave part of the wage function for very high
wages. In practice however, we do not observe contracts with negative option holdings. This raises
the question how costly it is to restrict the contract shape to being piecewise linear, i.e. implementable
by xed salary, stock and one option grant. In Table V we therefore compare the optimal nonlinear
contract (19) with the optimal piecewise linear contract (15).26 For both contracts, the table shows
the median change in wealth if the stock price increases or decreases by 30%. In addition, the table
shows how much shareholders could save (as a proportion of total observed compensation) if they
could recontract and replace the observed contract with the contract predicted by the models. These
savings from recontracting are dened as
Savings =
E
 
wd (PT )
  E (w (PT ))
E (wd (PT ))
; (23)
or, in words, the percentage reduction in the costs of the optimal predicted contract compared to
those of the observed contract. These savings are e¤ectively what is maximized when our algorithm
searches for the optimal contract. Note that by construction, the savings of the optimal general
contract must be higher than the savings of the piecewise linear contract.
26We report more detailed results for 11 values of the reference wage in the Internet Appendix, Table A.V.
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[Insert Table V here]
The table shows that the linear option contract is always steeper than the general nonlinear
contract because the linear contract does not feature dismissals, so that all incentives are provided
through the wage function. The di¤erence in slopes increases with the reference wage as the dismissal
probability for the nonlinear contract increases. As the reference wage increases, the linear contract
becomes less convex and becomes concave for   0:6. In contrast, the nonlinear contract is convex
for all levels of .
The savings are not substantial for either version of the contract. This is important, because it
shows that even where the distance between observed contracts and predicted contracts appears large
in terms of the metric developed above, the savings are insubstantial, particularly for the piecewise
linear contract. The di¤erence in savings between the piecewise linear contract and the general
nonlinear contract is small: For  = 0, it is 0:3% (= 0:5%   0:2%) of total compensation costs,
or $0.09 million for the median CEO with a pay package worth $29.8 million. Even if  = 1, this
di¤erence is only 9:4% (15:0%   5:6%) or $2.80 million, which is about 0.12% of the value of the
median company. These savings have to be related to the governance costs of writing and enforcing
such a general contract. We suspect that for most companies, the benets of incentive provision
through CEO dismissals rather than through high-powered wage functions will be negligible.
V. Robustness checks
We perform seven robustness checks. To conserve space, we only include the results for the rst
check here, all other tables are contained in the Internet Appendix (see http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp).
Preference parameters. We have based our discussion on the estimates of , , and  from the
experimental literature. These estimates might be inappropriate for the study of CEOs, so we check
the robustness of our results with respect to di¤erent values for these parameters.
[Insert Table VI here]
Table VI reports the results of a comparative static analysis for the linear model in terms of
the preference parameters where the reference wage wR is set to last years xed salary plus 10%
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of the risk-neutral value of last years stock and option holdings (i.e.  = 0:1). From the metric D
we can see that the LA-model performs better if we increase the loss aversion-parameter , whereas
the performance of the model deteriorates for increases in the curvature of the value function, i.e.,
for reductions in  and . Increases in  and  make the value function locally risk-neutral, so
this result is similar to the improvement with convergence to risk neutrality noted earlier in the
discussion of Table II. For high -values and -values the attitude to risk depends then only on
the degree of loss aversion , but unlike risk aversion, loss aversion is a local property of the value
function in the neighborhood of the reference point. The results of Table VI therefore underline
that it is this local property that is responsible for the better performance of the LA-model, which
improves further if this aspect is emphasized (higher ,  and ). In particular, higher loss aversion
() reduces the incidence of dismissals, which in turn makes for better approximation to observed
contracts (see Corollary 1). Conversely, for a lower degree of loss aversion and stronger curvature of
the value function (lower ,  and ) the value function becomes more similar to that of the standard
CRRA-model with  = 1  in the gain space, where more than 86% of the probability mass lies for
the base scenario in Table VI (see Table II Panel A). The performance of the LA-model deteriorates
accordingly and becomes more similar to that of the RA-model.
Owners versus managers. As a second robustness check we try to identify those observations
where the LA-model performs poorly. We split the sample into a subsample with the 54 owner-
executives who own 5% or more of the shares of their rm and a subsample with the remaining 541
CEOs who own less than 5% of their rm. See Table B.III in the Internet Appendix for complete
results.
According to our metric D, the LA-model performs much worse for the owner-managers than
for the non-owner managers. For  = 0:1, the median distance is 0:13 for non-owner managers
compared to 2:24 for owner-managers. Still, the LA-model performs better than the RA-model in
both subsamples. Closer inspection of the data shows that these results are driven by those owner-
manager CEOs who have no options (one example in our data set is Warren Bu¤ett). We conclude
from this discussion that the LA-model should not be applied to these CEOs. Their relationship
to the rm cannot be described by a principal-agent relationship as they are not salaried agents of
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outside shareholders.27
Restrict salaries and option holdings to be non-negative. Our analysis of the base case
allows for negative salaries and option holdings. However, many previous authors have imposed
tighter restrictions and we therefore repeat our analysis and require that salary and option holdings
cannot become negative, i.e.   0 and nO  0, which also rules out concave contracts. The results
in Table B.IV in the Internet Appendix show that ruling out concave contracts and negative base
salaries improves the performance of the RA-model signicantly. However, the RA-model is still not
able to generate positive salaries and positive option holdings simultaneously and one of the two new
constraints always binds. We conclude that the RA-model is only able to generate positive salaries
or positive option holdings if we impose this as a restriction on the maximization problem, but even
with these assumptions the LA-model still dominates the RA-model for the typical CEO.
Remove outliers. We remove two extreme observations from our data set (Warren Bu¤ett and
Steven Ballmer) who have a contract value that exceeds $10 billion and causes the mean contract
value in Table I to exceed the 90% quantile. When we recompute the main Tables III and IV, the
numerical changes in the results are miniscule. See Tables B.V to B.VII in the Internet Appendix
for complete results. We can safely conclude that these two outliers do not a¤ect our results.
Biases in our sample. The rms in our sample have a signicantly lower stock return volatility
and grant signicantly more options to their CEOs compared to the full ExecuComp CEO sample
(see Table I). We therefore split our data set into quintiles, once according to volatility , and
once according to option holdings ndO. We then recompute Tables III and IV separately for the
quintiles (see Tables B.VIII to B.XI in the Internet Appendix) and nd that the t of the LA-model
is clearly worse for high levels of volatility and somewhat worse for high levels of option holdings.
Nevertheless, the LA-model continues to dominate the RA-model in more than 94% of all cases. The
bias in our sample towards higher option holdings therefore works against the LA-model, whereas the
bias towards lower volatility makes the LA-model look slightly better. Our qualitative conclusions
are not a¤ected by these biases.
27The agency problem in these companies is more likely that between the inside blockholder and minority shareholders,
and this problem cannot be captured by a model based on e¤ort aversion.
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Analysis for 1997. We repeat our analysis for 1997, the rst year for which we can calculate our
wealth measure from ExecuComp. The results are shown in Tables B.XII and B.XIII in the Internet
Appendix. In 1997, option holdings were much lower than in the 2005 sample analyzed above. Also,
options were less in the money, and the stock price volatility was much lower than in 2005. Consistent
with the comparative statics ndings from the previous robustness check, we nd that the LA-model
performs better for 1997 than for 2005.
Wealth robustness check. Our measurement of non-rm wealth cumulates the CEOs past in-
come and adjusts for purchases and sales of securities. The actual wealth may be higher than this
(e.g., if the CEO has saved income earned before she enters the database) or lower (e.g., if the sav-
ings rate was less than 100% and some income was consumed). We therefore recalculate Table III
twice: once after reducing the estimate of wealth by 50% and once after increasing it by 100%. The
results are shown in Table B.XIV in the Internet Appendix. We nd that none of our results changes
markedly. Wealth plays a much more prominent role in the RA-model than in the LA-model. For an
agent with CRRA utility, an increase in wealth is similar to a decrease in the risk-aversion parameter
. Correspondingly, the equivalent  from (18) increases with increasing wealth and o¤sets this e¤ect.
Overall, none of our results seems to be a¤ected by measurement errors of CEO wealth.
VI. Conclusion
We analyze stylized contracts to compensate CEOs that consist of stock, options, and xed com-
pensation in a model where the CEO is loss-averse. We show that the loss-aversion model generates
optimal contracts that are similar to observed contracts for a range of parameterizations where the
reference wage of the CEO is low. By contrast, for higher reference wages the model generates con-
tracts that are concave and di¤erent from contracts observed in practice. We benchmark our results
against those for the standard risk-aversion model that is conventionally used for calibrations in the
compensation literature and nd that the loss-aversion model generates better approximations for
the large majority of CEOs in our sample, but generates poor approximations for owner-managers
with large stock holdings.
The loss-aversion model generates two important cross-sectional ndings that link CEO charac-
teristics to features of their compensation contracts or their employers (see Graham, Harvey, and
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Puri (2008) for such evidence). First, the more averse the agent is to losses, the more options are used
in the optimal contract, because the risk-tolerance e¤ect increases with the extent of loss-aversion.
This is in stark contrast to the risk-aversion model, where a more risk-averse agent receives fewer
options.28 Second, higher reference wages lead to a higher dismissal probability and to a lower
pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) on the job. So any variation in reference wages across CEOs
should result in a negative correlation between on-the-job PPS and the dismissal probability. As
performance-related dismissals require good corporate governance mechanisms, this nding is in line
with Fahlenbrachs (2009) result that good corporate governance and high PPS are substitutes. The
model then also suggests that rms with good corporate governance are more attractive for some
CEOs (those with high reference wage) than for others or, inversely, that corporate governance is
inuenced by CEO characteristics.
We conclude that the loss-aversion model is a promising candidate for analyzing executive com-
pensation contracts. However, the results are sensitive to the assumptions on the reference wage.
Little research is available on the way individuals establish reference points, and we are not aware
of any research that addresses reference wages in a compensation context. Also, our application
infers parameter values from the experimental literature. This literature mostly reports results on
non-strategic experiments of individual decision-making. Experiments of strategic contexts like ours
would enhance our understanding of how individuals set reference points. More research in this di-
rection is needed before a nal verdict on the suitability of the loss-aversion model can be reached.
In the meantime, the loss-aversion model - parametrized with a low reference wage - may still serve
as a suitable workhorse to address normative questions. Its main advantage is that it avoids asking
questions on option design from a model that has di¢ culty accommodating the existence of options.
Our analysis relies on stylized contracts that abstract from a number of features of observed
contracts. The simplest and probably most innocuous assumption restricts the number of option
grants to one. Multiple strike prices would allow for a better approximation of the piecewise linear
contract to the optimal nonlinear contract, and we have shown that the benets from such a better
approximation are small. We also ignore pension commitments, the use of perks, and loans the
corporation extends to its o¢ cers, largely because we do not have data on these items. These
28 In the simple risk-aversion model that we consider in this paper, the CEO never receives any (long position) in
options. However, there are a few extensions of this model (e.g., models with sticky salaries) that can explain some
option holdings (see footnote 2). In these models, option holdings decrease in the agents risk-aversion.
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compensation items are not related to stock price performance, so they only bias our estimate of
xed compensation downward. Another unrealistic aspect (not only of the LA-model but also of
the RA-model) is the fact that they are both static, whereas shareholders and CEOs typically revise
their contracts repeatedly over a number of periods. The development of tractable dynamic models
will be an important task for future research.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
We prove the proposition in three steps. In the rst step, Lemma 1 shows that the contract never
pays out in the interior of the loss space. In Lemma 1 we extend the set of permissible contracts to
contracts that pay out lotteries. The agent is risk-seeking over losses, so lotteries might be part of
the optimal contract. The agent is risk-averse in the gain space. Lotteries over payouts in the gain
space are therefore never optimal. Lemma 2 shows that the optimal contract never features lotteries
and that the optimal contract pays out w for all realized stock prices below some threshold. If the
stock price exceeds this threshold, the contract always pays out wages that are perceived as gains
by the agent. Lemma 2 greatly reduces the set of contracts from which we have to nd the optimal
contract. In the third step, we set up the Lagrangian for the simplied problem, derive the rst-order
condition, and show that the rst order conditions are su¢ cient. To conserve space, we defer the
more technical proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 to the Internet Appendix that is available online in
the "Supplements and Datasets" section at http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp.
Throughout we assume that the principal wishes to implement some given e¤ort level be. We
develop the argument rst for a generic setup because the argument is then more compact. Hence,
we assume that f(PT jbe) is a continuous density that satises the monotone likelihood ratio property
and later assume that f is the lognormal.
LEMMA 1. (Lotteries): Consider a contract w (PT ) that, for some realized stock price PT , pays o¤
w0 in the interior of the loss space with some positive probability, such that w < w0 < wR. Then there
always exists an alternative contract that improves on the contract w (PT ) where the manager receives
the reference wage wR with probability l and the minimum wage w with the remaining probability 1 l.
See the Internet Appendix for a proof of Lemma 1.
LEMMA 2. (Shape of the loss space): There exists a cut-o¤ value bP such that the optimal
contract w(PT ) pays out in the loss space for all PT  bP and in the gain space for all PT > bP .
When the contract pays out in the loss space, it always pays the minimum feasible wage: w(PT jPT bP ) = w.
See the Internet Appendix for a proof of Lemma 2.
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The optimal contract in the gain space. Lemma 2 allows us to rewrite the principals program
(4), (5), and (7) as follows:
minbP ;w(PT )wR
Z 1
bP w (PT ) f(PT jbe)dPT + wF ( bP jbe) (A.1)
s:t:
Z 1
bP V (w (PT )) f(PT jbe)dPT + V (w)F ( bP jbe)  V + C (be) ; (A.2)Z 1
bP V (w (PT )) fe(PT jbe)dPT + V (w)Fe( bP jbe)  C 0 : (A.3)
The derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to w (PT ) at each point PT  bP is:
@L
@w(PT )
= f(PT jbe)  PCV 0 (w (PT )) f(PT jbe)  ICV 0 (w (PT )) fe(PT jbe)
= f(PT jbe) 1  PCV 0 (w (PT ))  ICV 0 (w (PT ))LR (PT ) : (A.4)
Setting (A.4) to zero and solving gives the optimal contract in the gain space as:
V 0 (w (PT )) = [PC + ICLR (PT )] 1 ; (A.5)
where LR (PT ) denotes again the likelihood ratio.
Uniqueness and denition of bP : To nd bP we take the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect
to bP :
@L
@ bP =

w   w( bP ) f( bP jbe) + PC V (w( bP ))  V (w) f( bP jbe)
+ IC

V (w( bP ))  V (w) fe( bP jbe) (A.6)
= 

V (w( bP ))  V (w) f( bP jbe) " w( bP )  w
V (w( bP ))  V (w)   PC   ICLR
 bP jbe# : (A.7)
This derivative of the Lagrangian is zero if the term in squared brackets in (A.7) is zero. Substituting
equation (A.5) and rearranging yields:
@L
@ bP = 0, V (w( bP ))  V (w)  V 0 (w (PT ))

w( bP )  w = 0: (A.8)
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The derivative of the left hand side of (A.8) with respect to PT is:
 V 00 (w (PT ))w0 (PT )

w( bP )  w > 0; (A.9)
where w0 and V 00 denote rst and second derivatives, respectively. The expression in (A.9) is positive
because V 00 < 0 from the concavity of V in the gain space and w0 > 0 since the wage function (A.5)
is monotonically increasing because of the monotone likelihood ratio property. Hence, bP is unique.
Finally, we note that a contract that pays out only in the loss space cannot be optimal as it does
not provide any incentives, so bP <1.
Su¢ ciency. In the Internet Appendix, we show that equation (19) is also a su¢ cient condition for
the optimal contract.
Derivation of the optimal contract for the lognormal distribution. For the Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) preferences (3) we can rewrite (A.5) as:
w (PT ) = w
R + [ (PC + ICLR (PT jbe))] 11  ; (A.10)
and equation (A.8) becomes:


w( bP )  w    wR   w w( bP )  wR1    w( bP )  wR = 0: (A.11)
Equation (A.9) also implies that w( bP ) > wR.
We derive equation (19) by substituting the relevant expressions for the lognormal distribution.
From (1), ln (PT ) is distributed normal with mean m (e) = ln (P0 (e)) +

rf   22

T and standard
deviation 
p
T . The density f (PT je) of the lognormal distribution is then:
f (PT jbe) = 1
PT
p
2T
exp
(
  [lnPT  m (be)]2
22T
)
; (A.12)
and the likelihood ratio is
LR (PT je) = P
0
0 (be)
P0 (be) lnPT  m (be)2T : (A.13)
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We use the following denitions:
1 = IC
P 00 (be)
P0 (be)2T ; (A.14)
0 = 

PC   IC P
0
0 (e)
P0 (e)
m (be)
2T

= PC   1m (be) : (A.15)
We now substitute (A.13) into (A.10) and use the denitions (A.14) and (A.15) to write:
 (PC + ICLR (PT jbe)) = 0 + 1 lnPT . (A.16)
Equation (19) follows immediately from equation (A.16) together with the fact that the contract
pays w for PT < bP . With (A.14) and (A.15) equation (A.11) becomes:

 
wR   w = 0 + 1 ln bP  wR   w + (1  )0 + 1 ln bP 11  : (A.17)
This equation denes the threshold bP . 
B. Derivation of equation (21)
Equation (A.5) provides the optimality condition for the gain space of the LA-model. The same
expression also holds for the RA-model, where V then represents the utility function with risk
aversion. Total di¤erentiation of (A.5) yields:
V 00 (w) dw =   [PC + ICLR (PT )] 2 ICLR0 (PT ) dPT =  V 0 (w)2 ICLR0 (PT ) dPT :
Rearranging and using the denition of RT (w) gives equation (21).
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Table I: Description of the data set 
This table displays mean, standard deviation, and the 10%, 50% and 90% quantiles of the variables in our 
dataset. Panel A describes our sample of 595 CEOs. Panel B describes all 1,103 executives in the 
ExecuComp database who were CEO in 2004 and 2005. Panel B also contains the statistic of the two-
sample t-test for equal means (allowing for different variances) and the Wilcoxon signed rank test for equal 
locations. These tests compare the samples in Panel A and B. Before calculating this statistic, we removed 
all observations from the sample in Panel B that are also contained in the sample in Panel A. “Value of 
contract” is the market value of the compensation package π = φ + nS*P0 + nO*BS, where BS is the Black-
Scholes option value. All dollar amounts are in millions. 
 
Panel A: Data set with 595 U.S. CEOs 
 
Variable Mean Std. dev. 10% Quantile Median 90% Quantile
Stock nS 1.87% 5.18% 0.04% 0.31% 3.78% 
Options nO 1.44% 1.42% 0.15% 1.03% 3.24% 
Fixed salary φ 2.50 3.11 0.59 1.67 4.69 
Value of contract π 179.0 1,887.7 5.5 29.8 158.0 
Non-firm wealth W0 33.3 113.2 2.3 10.3 60.9 
Firm value P0 10,651 30,260 342 2,275 19,810 
Strike price K 8,243 26,213 242 1,480 13,915 
Moneyness K/P0 70.1% 20.5% 40.3% 70.8% 98.9% 
Maturity T 4.6 1.3 3.4 4.4 6.0 
Stock volatility σ 42.8% 21.4% 22.9% 36.1% 75.1% 
Dividend rate d 1.24% 2.70% 0.00% 0.61% 3.28% 
Age  56.6 6.6 48 57 64 
 
Panel B: All 1,103 ExecuComp CEO’s from 2005 
 
P-Value of Variable Mean Std. dev. 10% Quantile Median
90% 
Quantile T-test Wilcoxon
Stock nS 2.25% 6.08% 0.03% 0.32% 6.25% 0.267 0.767 
Options nO 1.25% 1.60% 0.12% 0.76% 2.81% 0.038 0.001 
Fixed Salary φ 2.24 3.25 0.53 1.47 4.16 0.176 0.041 
Firm Value P0 7,454 23,149 433 2,055 16,262 0.047 0.229 
Stock Volatility σ 49.4% 37.2% 22.7% 39.1% 86.1% 0.000 0.019 
Dividend Rate d 1.14% 1.53% 0.00% 0.49% 3.26% 0.439 0.410 
Age   56.0 7.6 47 56 65 0.185 0.045 
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Table II: Optimal piecewise linear contracts 
This table describes the optimal piecewise linear contract. It shows the median of the three parameters of 
the optimal contract, namely base salary φ*, stock holdings nS*, and option holdings nO*. It also shows the 
mean of the scaled errors: error(φ)=(φ*– φd)/σφ, error(nS)=(nS*– nSd)/σS, and error(nO)=(nO*– nOd)/σO, where 
σφ, σS,  and σO denote the cross-sectional standard deviations of base salaries, stock holdings, and option 
holdings, respectively, and where superscript ‘d’ denotes parameter values from the observed contract. The 
table also shows the mean and median of the distance metric D from equation (17), and the average 
probability of a loss, i.e., Prob(w*(PT) < wR). Panel A displays the results for the loss aversion model for 
seven different reference wages parameterized by θ from equation (16). Panel B shows the results for the 
risk aversion model for seven levels of the CRRA risk aversion parameter γ. Some observations are lost 
because of numerical problems. The last row in Panel A shows the corresponding values of the observed 
contract. 
 
Panel A: Loss-aversion model 
 
Salary (φ)  Stock (nS)  Options (nO)   Distance D 
 θ Obs. 
Avg. 
Prob. of 
Loss Median 
Mean 
Error  Median
Mean 
Error  Median
Mean 
Error   Mean Median
0.0 594 4.1% 0.29 -1.594 0.005 0.103 0.007 -0.429 0.54 0.16 
0.1 578 13.6% 1.47 0.346 0.005 0.015 0.009 -0.022 0.71 0.15 
0.2 571 20.1% 1.29 -0.049 0.006 0.050 0.007 -0.135 1.44 0.40 
0.4 585 31.3% -2.89 3.027 0.011 0.285 0.001 -1.136 2.40 0.87 
0.6 586 41.1% -6.74 2.337 0.017 0.526 -0.002 -2.271 3.07 1.13 
0.8 585 51.0% -8.26 -3.294 0.018 0.647 -0.003 -2.921 3.32 1.23 
1.0 582 58.3% -8.89 -10.729 0.019 0.708 -0.005 -3.292 3.47 1.28 
Data 595 N/A 1.67 N/A  0.003 N/A  0.010 N/A   N/A N/A 
 
 
Panel B: Risk-aversion model 
 
Salary (φ)  Stock (nS)  Options (nO)   Distance D 
 γ Obs. Median Mean Error  Median
Mean 
Error  Median
Mean 
Error   Mean Median
0.1 595 -8.68 -9.738 0.018 0.699 -0.004 -3.083 3.16 1.09 
0.2 593 -8.83 -9.948 0.018 0.724 -0.005 -3.265 3.35 1.17 
0.5 595 -8.84 -10.150 0.020 0.749 -0.007 -3.625 3.71 1.40 
1 593 -8.27 -9.770 0.021 0.702 -0.011 -3.827 3.89 1.68 
3 594 -5.17 -6.682 0.016 0.494 -0.014 -3.953 3.99 2.01 
6 585 -1.23 -3.582 0.010 0.260 -0.011 -3.384 3.40 1.83 
20 487 0.97 -0.418 0.005 0.050 -0.006 -2.779 2.81 1.54 
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Table III: Comparison of loss-aversion model with matched risk-aversion model 
This table compares the optimal loss-aversion contract with the equivalent optimal risk-aversion contract where each CEO has constant relative risk aversion with 
parameter γ, which is chosen such that both models predict the same certainty equivalent for the observed contract (equation (18)). Contracts are piecewise linear. The 
table shows the average equivalent γ, the mean and median of the difference between the metric D between the RA-model and the LA-model (see equation (17)), and 
the frequency of this difference being positive. The table also shows the frequency of positive optimal option holdings, the frequency of positive optimal salaries, and 
the frequency of both (options and salary) being positive. Results are shown for eleven different reference wages parameterized by θ from equation (16). Some 
observations are lost because of numerical problems. ***, **, * denote significance of the T-test for zero mean and, respectively, the Wilcoxon signed rank test for 
zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
    
−RA LAD D  
Percent with positive 
option holdings  
Percent with positive 
fixed salary 
Percent with positive 
options and salary θ Obs. 
Average 
equivalent 
γ Percent > 0 Mean Median  RA LA   RA LA  RA LA 
0.0 594 0.21 96.6% 2.75*** 0.92*** 30.8% 83.3% 1.7% 59.6% 0.3% 52.5% 
0.1 578 0.28 97.2% 2.64*** 0.87*** 30.1% 91.0% 1.6% 77.5% 0.0% 74.2% 
0.2 571 0.41 91.8% 2.04*** 0.63*** 28.2% 82.0% 1.9% 62.7% 0.4% 60.2% 
0.3 577 0.52 87.7% 1.54*** 0.44*** 28.1% 68.3% 1.6% 46.8% 0.3% 44.0% 
0.4 585 0.68 89.7% 1.20*** 0.30*** 25.8% 56.9% 1.4% 32.6% 0.0% 30.6% 
0.5 586 0.83 91.0% 0.95*** 0.27*** 25.6% 48.3% 1.7% 20.6% 0.3% 19.3% 
0.6 586 0.95 90.3% 0.72*** 0.25*** 22.5% 41.3% 1.5% 12.8% 0.0% 11.1% 
0.7 582 1.04 88.7% 0.59*** 0.24*** 20.8% 36.6% 2.1% 8.6% 0.0% 6.4% 
0.8 582 1.09 86.4% 0.59*** 0.22*** 21.0% 33.7% 2.1% 6.5% 0.0% 4.1% 
0.9 579 1.06 84.1% 0.50*** 0.18*** 21.2% 32.5% 2.2% 4.1% 0.2% 2.6% 
1.0 581 0.98 82.1% 0.38*** 0.14***  22.2% 31.5% 2.1% 3.3% 0.0% 1.9% 
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Table IV: Optimal nonlinear loss-aversion contracts 
This table describes the optimal nonlinear loss-aversion contract. The table shows the median change in 
wealth if the stock price changes by -50%, -30%, +30%, or +50%. In addition, the table shows the average 
dismissal probability, defined as the probability with which the contract pays the minimum wage w (from 
equation (20)), the incentives from dismissals that are generated by the drop to the minimum wage w, and 
the mean inflection quantile, which is the quantile at which the curvature of the optimal wage function 
changes from convex to concave. Results are shown for eleven different reference wages parameterized by 
θ. Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. 
 
Median change in wealth if stock price 
changes by θ Obs. 
Mean 
dismissal 
probability 
Incentives 
from 
dismissals 
Mean 
inflection 
quantile -50% -30% +30% +50% 
0.0 571 0.00% 0.01% 98.9% -59.7% -37.8% 41.2% 70.1%
0.1 571 0.05% 0.30% 99.9% -55.5% -35.9% 41.8% 71.8%
0.2 570 0.56% 2.70% 100.0% -49.4% -32.6% 39.9% 70.4%
0.3 574 1.83% 8.79% 100.0% -40.8% -27.8% 36.9% 65.8%
0.4 572 4.13% 17.00% 100.0% -31.4% -22.3% 32.2% 58.4%
0.5 573 6.53% 24.54% 100.0% -23.0% -16.8% 26.5% 49.6%
0.6 573 9.30% 32.80% 100.0% -16.8% -12.1% 20.4% 39.1%
0.7 574 12.12% 40.19% 100.0% -12.6% -8.9% 16.4% 31.0%
0.8 569 14.82% 47.21% 100.0% -9.8% -6.4% 12.7% 24.4%
0.9 563 17.30% 53.57% 100.0% -8.4% -4.7% 9.8% 19.5%
1.0 547 19.89% 59.32% 100.0% -8.2% -3.5% 7.5% 15.3%
 
 
 
 
Table V: Comparison of linear and nonlinear loss-aversion models 
This table compares the optimal piecewise linear loss-aversion contract with the optimal nonlinear loss-
aversion contract. For both models, the table shows the median change in wealth if the stock price changes 
by -30% or +30%. In addition, the table shows the savings [E(wd(PT)) – E(w*(PT))] / E(wd(PT)) the models 
predict from switching from the observed contract to the optimal contract. Results are shown for seven 
different reference wages parameterized by θ. Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. 
 
Linear option contract  General nonlinear contract 
Median change in wealth if 
stock price changes by 
Median change in wealth if 
stock price changes by θ Obs. 
-30% +30% 
Mean 
savings  -30% +30% 
Mean 
savings 
0.0 570 -39.0% 47.1% 0.2% -37.9% 41.3% 0.5% 
0.1 557 -39.5% 49.8% 0.4% -35.9% 41.8% 1.5% 
0.2 547 -38.6% 47.7% 1.0% -32.5% 40.1% 3.3% 
0.4 567 -34.3% 37.4% 2.3% -22.2% 32.2% 6.9% 
0.6 570 -32.9% 32.5% 3.7% -12.1% 20.4% 10.1% 
0.8 569 -33.7% 30.6% 4.9% -6.4% 12.7% 13.0% 
1.0 546 -34.8% 30.7% 5.6% -3.5% 7.5% 15.0% 
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Table VI: Comparative statics for the parameters of the value function 
This table describes the optimal piecewise linear loss-aversion contract for different values of the 
parameters α, β, and λ of the value function (equation (3)). The reference wage wR is set equal to last year’s 
fixed salary plus 10% of the risk-neutral value of last year’s stock and option holdings, i.e. θ = 0.1 in 
equation (16). Panel A shows the results for the parameter λ, Panel B for α, and Panel C for β. The table 
shows the mean and median of the three parameters of the optimal contract, namely, base salary φ*, stock 
holdings nS*, and option holdings nO*. In addition, it displays the mean and median of the distance metric D 
from equation (17). Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. 
 
Panel A: Loss aversion parameter λ 
 
Salary (φ) Stock (nS) Options (nO)  D λ Obs. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median
1.00 413 -2.28 0.26 0.040 0.007 -0.013 0.004 2.05 0.17 
1.50 452 1.53 1.34 0.026 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.76 0.13 
2.00 459 2.36 1.58 0.022 0.005 0.013 0.009 0.55 0.13 
2.25 578 3.60 1.47 0.019 0.005 0.014 0.009 0.71 0.15 
2.50 471 2.61 1.63 0.021 0.006 0.016 0.010 0.62 0.12 
3.00 465 2.82 1.68 0.020 0.005 0.015 0.010 0.63 0.13 
4.00 466 2.97 1.77 0.020 0.005 0.017 0.010 0.68 0.13 
 
Panel B: Gain space curvature α 
 
Salary (φ) Stock (nS) Options (nO)  D α Obs. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median
0.60 312 -1.30 0.51 0.024 0.006 -0.004 0.002 1.24 0.28 
0.70 362 -0.98 0.39 0.023 0.007 -0.003 0.003 1.39 0.26 
0.80 394 0.09 0.81 0.028 0.007 0.003 0.006 1.05 0.18 
0.88 578 3.60 1.47 0.019 0.005 0.014 0.009 0.71 0.15 
0.95 546 2.97 1.93 0.019 0.003 0.016 0.011 0.76 0.11 
 
Panel C: Loss space curvature β 
 
Salary (φ) Stock (nS) Options (nO)  D β Obs. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median
0.60 267 -4.59 -1.33 0.022 0.007 -0.002 0.002 1.17 0.29 
0.70 349 -6.24 -1.40 0.034 0.009 -0.014 0.001 2.36 0.39 
0.80 388 0.16 0.94 0.036 0.006 -0.005 0.007 1.64 0.14 
0.88 578 3.60 1.47 0.019 0.005 0.014 0.009 0.71 0.15 
0.95 508 2.58 1.64 0.020 0.005 0.015 0.010 0.63 0.13 
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Figure 1. Optimal and observed contracts for a representative CEO. The gure plots the
end-of-period wealth for the loss-aversion-contract (equation (19)) for two reference wages ( = 0:2
and  = 0:8), the risk-aversion-contract for  = 2, and the observed contract for a representative CEO
in our sample. The parameters of the observed contract are  = $2:3m, nS = 0:30%, nO = 0:95%.
Initial nonrm wealth is W0 = $10:5m, P0 is $2:3bn, K=P0 is 54%, T = 4:2 years, rf = 3:6%, and
d = 2:0%.
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